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Participation and Welfare in Auctions with Default
Joosung Lee∗ Daniel Z. Li†
Abstract
Consumer protection may induce some socially undesirable outcomes in a competi-
tive bidding environment. In an auction with costly participation, we show that the
possibility of default may cause social welfare loss through two channels. One is the
possibility of no trade when a default occurs, and the other is the under participation
of bidders in equilibrium. We also provide closed-form solutions to the default prob-
ability, the expected winning rent and social welfare.
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1 Introduction
The past decades has witnessed an increase in consumer rights, along with the rapid
growth of internet sales. For instance, the latest EU law (Directive 2011/83/EU) on
distance sales contracts has extended consumers’ right to withdraw from a sale from 7
to 14 days. The rationale behind is that internet consumers are usually informationally
disadvantaged when compared with those shopping in bricks-and-mortar stores. In this
paper, however, we would argue that the (over) protection of consumer rights may induce
some socially undesirable outcomes in a competitive bidding environment.
The literature typically models consumer protection as a kind of limited liability con-
straints; that is, there exists an upper bound for a consumer’s ex-post loss. It takes the
usual forms of withdrawal rights, return policies, and defaults as special cases. Here we
will consider an auction with a participation cost and default possibility. Specifically, a
bidder needs to pay an entry cost to attend the auction, and he makes the entry decision
before learning his private signal on the product. After the auction, uncertainty about
the product value is revealed, and a winning bidder then decides whether to proceed with
the auction payment or default.
If there is no default, a well-known result in the literature is that equilibrium outcomes
are socially efficient (McAfee and McMillan, 1987). However, when a default is possible,
we show that it may cause social welfare loss through two channels. The first is obvious,
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as the product is not allocated when the default occurs. The second is more subtle. We
show that the possibility of default reduces the expected winning rent and hence deter
entries. The resulted under-participation of bidders also induces welfare loss.
The other contribution of this paper is that, by applying some properties of order
statistics, we provide closed-form solutions to the default probability, the expected winning
rent and social welfare, in a model of auctions with default. These closed-form results
can be conveniently applied to other related studies.
Our paper is mainly related to two strands of literature. The first is on auctions with
costly participation, where bidders make entry decisions before knowing their valuations
(McAfee and McMillan, 1987). Li (2017) further compares the degrees of equilibrium
competition in three common forms of auctions with costly participation. The second is
on auctions with a default possibility. This literature produces similar results that the
possibility of default induces more aggressive bids and reduces bidders’ payoffs. Specif-
ically, Waehrer (1995) considers an auction with a non-refundable deposit, which acts as
a measure to protect the seller from default. Zheng (2001) analyzes a common-value
auction where budget-constrained bidders can default. Board (2007) compares the out-
comes of the first and the second-price auction, where a winning bidder may default by
declaring bankruptcy. To our best knowledge, our paper is the first one to study costly
participation in auctions with default. Finally, our paper is also related the literature
on auctions with contingent payments where the auction payment is contingent on the
realization of future states (Skrzypacz, 2013, for a review).
2 The Model
A seller allocates an indivisible product among a finite set N of potential bidders. Both
the seller and the bidders are risk-neutral. Bidder i’s valuation of the product is
Vi = S +Xi, (1)
where Xi is bidder i’s idiosyncratic signal, and the random variable
S =
{
0 Pr = q
s̄ Pr = 1− q,
with s̄ > 0. Xi’s are independent draws from the same distribution F on [0,∞) with
density f > 0. F has increasing failure rate and a finite mean. S and Xi’s are independent
from each other. We consider a second price auction with participation cost and default
possibility, and the timing of the game is as follows:
• t = 1: Bidders make entry decisions before learning the realizations of S and Xi, and
the entry cost is c. They can observe how many bidders have entered the auction.
• t = 2: A participating bidder i learns the realization of Xi, denoted by xi, upon
which he submits a bid βi = β (xi). All the bids are then revealed, and the winning
bidder and the auction payment are determined according to the auction rule.
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• t = 3: The realization of S is observed, and the winning bidder decides whether to
proceed with the payment, or default where he needs to pay η > 0 to the seller.
If a default occurs, we assume there is no further action taken by the seller. For
example, she cannot reallocate the product to other bidders. We consider a symmetric
equilibrium where all the bidders adopt the same bidding strategy. We first derive a
bidder’s equilibrium bidding strategy, and then solve for his optimal entry decision.
2.1 Equilibrium Bidding Strategy
It is clear that a bidder with private signal x never bids more than x + s̄, and therefore,
when S = s̄, a winning bidder never defaults. When S = 0, the winning bidder will
default if x− p < −η, where p is his auction payment. The following assumption insures
the possibility of default in equilibrium.
Assumption 1 η < (1− q) s̄.
Lemma 1 Under assumption 1, a bidder’s equilibrium bidding strategy is
β (x) = x+ s̄− q
1− q
η. (2)
Proof. Let U (p, x) denote a bidder’s expected payoff conditional on winning with a bid
p and that both his and the highest private signal of other bidders are x. In a second-
price auction, it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid β (x) such that U (β (x) , x) = 0.
Assuming a winning bidder will default if S = 0, it then follows that U (β (x) , x) =
Pr (S = s̄) (s̄+ x− β (x)) − Pr (S = 0) η = 0. The equilibrium bidding strategy is thus
β (x) = x + s̄ − qη/ (1− q). We still need to verify the condition that a winning bidder
with U (β (x) , x) = 0 does default when S = 0, that is, x + 0 − β (x) < −η which is
equivalent to η < (1− q) s̄.
The equilibrium bidding strategy (2) is already known in the literature, e.g., Waehrer
(1995, Example 1) and Board (2007, Section A.1), and we have the following observations.
When η ≥ (1− q) s̄, default never occurs and a bidder just bids his expected valuation
of the product, that is, βe (x) = x + (1− q) s̄. We henceforth use the upper script “e”
to denote the case of no default, where the equilibrium outcomes are “efficient.” When
η < (1− q) s̄, it is clear that β (x) > βe (x), which indicates that the possibility of default
encourages bidders to bid more aggressively.
2.2 Default Probability
Denote n the number of participating bidders, and X
(k)
n the k-th largest order statistics
of n independent draws from F . The condition for a winning bidder to default is that: i)
S = 0, and ii) the ex-post payoff of making payment is smaller than −η, which is equivalent
to Zn := X
(1)
n −X(2)n < s̄− η1−q . Denote Gn (z) the distribution of Zn, and we have
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Lemma 2 The distribution function of Zn ∈ R+ is
Gn (z) = 1−
∫ +∞
0
f (y + z)
f (y)
dFn (y) . (3)
Moreover, the probability of default is qGn (s̄− η/ (1− q)), which is (i) decreasing in η,
and (ii) increasing (decreasing) in n if f (y + z) /f (y) is decreasing (increasing) in y.
Proof. According to Arnold et al. (2008, Result (2.3.2)), by replacing j = n, i = n − 1







h (x, z) = n (n− 1)F (x− z)n−2 f (x− z) f (x) , (4)
where x denotes the realization of X
(1)
n , and z ∈ [0, x] denotes that of Zn. Integrating
out x, we have the marginal density function of Zn,
gn (z) = n (n− 1)
∫ +∞
z
F (x− z)n−2 f (x− z) f (x) dx = n
∫ +∞
0
f (y + z) dFn−1 (y) .
The cumulative distribution of Zn is thus














F (y)n−1 d [F (y + z)− F (y)] = −n
∫ +∞
0




f (y + z)
f (y)
dFn (y) .
Finally, result (i) is self-evident, and (ii) is based on the fact that, with increasing n,
Fn (y)’s are ordered according to first-order stochastic dominance.
3 Equilibrium Entry and Welfare
This section derives the main results of this paper. First, we show that the possibility
of default induces under-participation in equilibrium. Second, we identify two channels
through which the possibility of default may cause social welfare loss.
3.1 Under-Participation
























It follows from simple calculations (please refer to Lemma 3 proof for details) that









Note that πe (n) := E [Zn] is the expected winning rent in the benchmark case of no
default. When η < (1− q) s̄, the second term on the RHS of (6) is strictly negative,
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which implies π (n) < πe (n). Therefore, the possibility of default reduces the expected
winning rent of the bidders. In a symmetric equilibrium, a bidder’s expected winning
rent is simply U (n) = π (n) /n, and we have the following result.










− (1− q)F (x)
]
Fn−1 (x) dx, (7)
which is i) increasing in η, and ii) strictly decreasing in n with limn→∞ U (n) = 0.
Proof. From (5), we have































Substituting Gn (z) in (3) and inter-changing the integration order, we have∫ s̄− η
1−q
0














































[1− F (x)]Fn−1 (x) dx.
Substituting both results into U (n) = π (n) /n, we then have (7). The proofs of result i)
and ii) are self-evident.
Lemma 3 shows that a bidder’s expected winning rent U (n) is increasing in η. For
comparison purpose, when η ≥ (1− q) s̄, we return to the case of no default and






[1− F (x)]Fn−1 (x) dx.
It is clear from (7) that U (n) < U e (n) when s̄ < η/ (1− q). We next denote n∗ and
n∗∗ respectively as the equilibrium number of participating bidders, in the two cases of
with and without default. Proposition 1 below then states that the possibility of default
induces under-participation of bidders in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, n∗ ≤ n∗∗.
Proof. From Lemma 3, the optimization conditions for n∗ and n∗∗ are U (n∗) ≥ c >
U (n∗ + 1) and U e (n∗∗) ≥ c > U e (n∗∗ + 1) respectively. Given that U e (n) > U (n) under
Assumption 1, and that both U (n) and U e (n) are strictly decreasing in n and converges
to 0 when n→∞, the result n∗ ≤ n∗∗ is then straightforward.
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3.2 Welfare Loss
Social welfare is the sum of the seller revenue and the bidder payoff. The seller revenue
is the auction payment if no default occurs, and η otherwise. The bidder payoff is the
winning rent net of the total entry costs. The expected social welfare W (n) is thus





















(η − η)− nc.
Simple transformation gives













∣∣∣∣Zn < s̄− η1− q
]
− nc. (8)
We note that, in the benchmark case of no default, the expected social welfare is





Proposition 2 reveals that the possibility of default causes social welfare loss.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, the expected social welfare is






xf (x) dFn−1 (x− z)
]
dz, (9)
which is increasing in η.






in (4). Denoting the




n |Zn < s̄− η/ (1− q)
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xf (x) dFn−1 (x− z)
]
dz.
It is clear that W (n) is increasing in η.
For given n, the reason for welfare loss is that the product is not allocated when a
default occurs, as shown by the second term on the RHS of (9). Furthermore, Proposition
1 indicates that the possibility of default induces under-participation in equilibrium, e.g.,
n∗ ≤ n∗∗, which also causes welfare loss. Let W (n∗) denote the equilibrium social welfare
with a default possibility, and W e (n∗∗) that in the case of no default. Note that the entry
number n∗∗ is efficient and W e (n∗∗) is the maximum expected social welfare. We then
can provide a decomposition result on welfare loss, as follows
W e (n∗∗)−W (n∗) = [W e (n∗∗)−W e (n∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
A: under participation
+ [W e (n∗)−W (n∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
B: possibility of no trade
. (10)
Equation (10) indicates the two channels through which the possibility of default may
cause social welfare loss. First, it induces under-participation in equilibrium, as shown in
Proposition 1 and term A of (10). Second, it implies a strictly positive probability that
the product is not allocated, as shown in Proposition 2 and term B of (10).
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